Published on: 2026-06-26
One government owes more than twice everything its economy produces in a year. Another sits near the very top of the same list yet holds one of the safest credit ratings on earth.
The world’s debt map in 2026 is full of contradictions like these, and the only fair way to read it is the measure economists actually use: debt-to-GDP, a government’s debt weighed against the size of the economy behind it. Raw dollar totals tell little on their own, because a large economy can shoulder far more than a small one.

Japan has the world’s highest debt-to-GDP ratio in 2026 at 204.4%, but it is mostly yen-denominated and domestically held, which keeps the burden manageable [1].
The ranking uses general government gross debt as a share of GDP. Because gross debt ignores the assets a government holds, it can overstate fiscal risk, most clearly for Singapore [1].
Singapore ranks second at 171.9%, yet its financial assets exceed its liabilities, leaving it with no net debt in the government’s own presentation [3].
The United States (about 126%) and China (about 107%) are not at the top, but matter most for global markets, with both projected to rise toward roughly 142% and 127% by 2031 [1].
Global public debt reached about 94% of GDP in 2025 and is set to approach 100% by 2029, so high ratios are increasingly common rather than exceptional [2].
A high debt-to-GDP ratio signals burden, not inevitable default; sustainability depends on currency, ownership, interest costs, maturities, growth, and credibility.
Heavy debt ratios are becoming more common: the IMF puts global public debt at about 94% of world GDP in 2025 and projects it to approach 100% by 2029 [2]. Across the wider IMF dataset, more than 20 economies exceed 100% of GDP.
The figures use IMF April 2026 World Economic Outlook and Fiscal Monitor projections for general government gross debt as a percentage of GDP, the broadest comparable cross-country measure [1]. Countries without a clean, comparable 2026 value, including Venezuela, Lebanon, and Sri Lanka (whose latest IMF reading is a 2024 figure), are excluded.
| Rank | Country | 2026 (% of GDP) | Quick read |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Japan | 204.4 | Domestic, yen-funded |
| 2 | Singapore | 171.9 | High gross debt, no net debt |
| 3 | Sudan | 169.1 | High-uncertainty estimate |
| 4 | Bahrain | 152.4 | Oil-revenue dependent |
| 5 | Italy | 138.4 | Deep euro bond market |
| 6 | Greece | 136.9 | Down from 200%+ peak |
| 7 | Senegal | 132.3 | Upward debt revision |
| 8 | Maldives | 129.4 | Small, tourism-reliant |
| 9 | United States | 125.8 | Reserve currency; rising path |
| 10 | Ukraine | 122.6 | War financing; restructuring |
| 11 | Bhutan | 120.3 | Hydropower loans; concessional |
| 12 | St. Vincent and the Grenadines | 120.1 | Disaster-exposed island |
| 13 | France | 118.4 | Deep euro-area market |
| 14 | Canada | 110.7 | Gross high; net much lower |
| 15 | Belgium | 109.2 | Long-standing high euro debt |
| 16 | China | 106.9 | Mostly domestic; local-government stress |
| 17 | Mozambique | 106.1 | Concessional-finance reliant |
| 18 | United Kingdom | 103.6 | Own-currency gilt market |
| 19 | Bolivia | 102.7 | Tighter external financing |
| 20 | Dominica | 98.3 | Small, disaster-prone island |
| 21 | Spain | 98.2 | Improving euro economy |
| 22 | Brazil | 96.5 | Local-currency; high real rates |
| 23 | Cabo Verde | 95.9 | Small, tourism-led |
| 24 | Finland | 93.1 | Rising but credible |
| 25 | Congo, Rep. | 91.3 | Oil, restructuring history |
| 26 | Barbados | 89.5 | Restructured; IMF-supported |
| 27 | Suriname | 87.1 | Restructured; oil prospects |
| 28 | Egypt, Arab Rep. | 87.0 | IMF-backed reforms |
| 29 | Mauritius | 86.5 | Small, diversified services |
| 30 | Gabon | 86.1 | Oil-dependent economy |
Source: IMF April 2026 World Economic Outlook / Fiscal Monitor, general government gross debt (% of GDP), 2026 projection [1]; cross-checked against the IMF DataMapper. Venezuela, Lebanon, and Sri Lanka are excluded because their available IMF values are not clean 2026 projections.
Japan has the world’s highest debt-to-GDP ratio in 2026, and by a wide margin. IMF projections put general government gross debt at 204.4% of GDP, meaning the government owes roughly twice the value of annual economic output [1]. Yet the country has avoided a funding crisis because the debt is mostly yen-denominated, domestically held, and supported by deep local savings.
Ownership is the key difference. Japan had about ¥1,026 trillion of government bonds outstanding at the end of 2025, and the holder base is overwhelmingly domestic [5]:
The Bank of Japan held roughly 49%, the legacy of years of large-scale bond purchases.
Domestic banks and insurers held about 31% between them.
Foreign investors owned less than 7%, which sharply reduces exposure to sudden capital flight or foreign-currency refinancing stress.
The risk is real, but it is gradual rather than sudden. Japan faces weak growth, rapid ageing, and rising refinancing costs as ultra-low interest rates fade. The debt ratio shows the weight of the burden; the currency, the investor base, and the central-bank role explain why that burden has stayed manageable.
Singapore’s 171.9% debt-to-GDP ratio is the clearest warning against reading gross debt as a solvency score [1]. It ranks near the top of the global table, yet the government has no net debt, because its financial assets exceed its liabilities [3]. The gross number counts borrowings but ignores the public assets built on the other side of the balance sheet.
The reason is because Singapore does not borrow to fund day-to-day fiscal deficits. Its government securities are issued for purposes unrelated to deficit financing:
developing and deepening the domestic bond market;
providing safe, long-term assets for the Central Provident Fund (CPF) pension system; and
funding nationally significant infrastructure.
The proceeds are invested rather than consumed, which makes the gross ratio look far heavier than the state’s true fiscal position. The sharper question for Singapore is not whether gross debt looks high, but whether assets exceed liabilities and investment income supports the budget.
On that test the picture changes completely: the gross ratio measures balance-sheet size, while net debt measures fiscal strain, and Singapore’s risk sits firmly in the first category, not the second [3].
The United States and China are not the two highest-ranked countries, but they are the two that matter most for global markets. The US sits near 125.8% of GDP in 2026, while China stands around 106.9% [1].
IMF projections run to 2031, and both paths point higher, with the US heading toward about 142% and China toward roughly 127% [1], which matters because US Treasuries anchor global borrowing costs while China’s fiscal expansion shapes commodities, banks, trade, and emerging-market risk.
The US still enjoys the strongest funding privilege in the world. It borrows in the currency used for reserves, trade settlement, and global collateral, through the deepest sovereign bond market on earth. The risk is not market access today; it is the slow repricing of a rising debt path, because higher Treasury yields reset the cost of capital far beyond America.
China’s risk is different. Its debt is mostly domestic, which limits sudden foreign-currency pressure but concentrates stress inside local governments, banks, property-linked balance sheets, and state financing vehicles. The question is less external default risk than whether public credit can keep supporting growth without weakening the financial system.
Neither country leads the table, but both shape the cycle behind it.
Small economies often look more fragile in a debt-to-GDP table because the denominator is narrow. The Maldives, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Dominica, and Cabo Verde rely heavily on tourism, imports, and external finance, so a weak travel season, a hurricane, or a jump in global interest rates can move the debt ratio sharply when GDP is small and volatile.
That is not the same as saying every small, high-debt economy is near default. Concessional loans, long maturities, multilateral support, and disaster financing can make a high ratio more manageable than it first appears. The headline number needs context: export base, foreign reserves, debt currency, refinancing schedule, and exposure to climate shocks.
Some entries are not ordinary market borrowers at all. Sudan’s figure carries unusually high uncertainty. Ukraine reflects war financing and restructuring pressure. Senegal’s near-132% ratio follows a major upward public-debt revision linked to hidden debt and continuing IMF discussions [4].
Barbados, Suriname, and the Republic of Congo sit in another category: post-restructuring borrowers rebuilding credibility. Their debt ratios still look high, but the direction of reform, the primary balance, and IMF engagement matter as much as the number itself. In this part of the table, debt-to-GDP is a warning light, not a full diagnosis.
Japan, at roughly 204% of GDP in the IMF’s April 2026 projection, the highest in the world by this measure [1].
Not by this ratio. The United States is around 126% of GDP, which places it in the middle of the top ten rather than at the top. It draws attention because of its size, its role as reserve-currency issuer, and a debt path the IMF expects to keep rising, toward roughly 142% by 2031 [1].
Because the figure is gross debt, which ignores assets. Singapore borrows mainly for investment, holds assets well in excess of its debt, and has effectively no net debt [3]; it is also rated AAA by the major agencies [6]. Its high gross ratio reflects strategy, not distress.
No. The ratio measures burden, not inevitability. Whether a high level is sustainable depends on the currency the debt is in, whether it is held domestically or abroad, interest costs, the maturity structure, economic growth, fiscal credibility, and the central-bank environment. Japan has stayed above 100% for decades without default, while some countries have run into difficulty at far lower ratios.
A debt-to-GDP ranking shows where government debt sits heaviest relative to economic output. It does not predict default by itself.
Sustainability depends on the debt currency, creditor base, refinancing cost, maturity profile, growth rate, and fiscal credibility. Japan, Singapore, and the US show why the same headline ratio can carry very different risks.
Debt-to-GDP is a starting point for sovereign-risk analysis, not a final judgement on solvency.
Fitch Ratings, affirmation of Singapore at AAA with a stable outlook (April 2026).