Published on: 2026-07-27
Updated on: 2026-07-27
The Democratic Republic of the Congo mined 73% of the world’s cobalt in 2025, then restricted how much could leave the country while production continued. Global supply still exceeded demand by 19kt, yet cobalt metal prices rose 130% as material accumulated inside the DRC and inventories elsewhere tightened.
The market stopped pricing how much cobalt was mined and started pricing how much could cross the border.
The 2025 market showed a 19kt surplus when total mine supply was counted. Benchmark’s export-adjusted model showed a 96kt ex-DRC deficit, while the DRC exported only about 41kt before the ban halted shipments.
The formal 2026 export ceiling is 96.6kt, equal to 35% of 2025 global demand. Routine allocations total 87kt, or 7,250 tonnes a month, with a separate 9.6kt strategic quota.
Cobalt metal rose 130% in 2025 and cobalt hydroxide gained 328%, placing the largest premium on feedstock closest to the restriction.
Completed exports now provide the clearest market signal. Larger quotas, faster Indonesian growth and lower cobalt use would loosen the squeeze.
Total cobalt supply reached 295kt in 2025 against 276kt of demand, leaving a 19kt surplus. Benchmark’s alternative balance, which uses DRC exports and production outside the DRC instead of total Congolese mine supply, showed a 96kt deficit.
The second figure measures accessible supply. It does not mean 96kt of cobalt physically disappeared. Mine statistics included material stored inside the DRC, while the market also drew on inventories, recycling and production elsewhere.
The table shows how the measurement basis reversed the market signal.
| Supply measure | Volume | Market implication |
|---|---|---|
| Total cobalt supply | 295kt | Included mined and secondary supply |
| Global cobalt demand | 276kt | Increased 13% year on year |
| Balance using total mine supply | +19kt | Indicated oversupply |
| Approximate DRC exports before the ban | 41kt | Material that reached the market in 2025 |
| Balance using DRC exports and ex-DRC production | -96kt | Indicated an accessible-supply deficit |
The two modelled balances differ by 115kt. That gap measures the effect of market access rather than metal that vanished. Cobalt accumulated inside the DRC while stockpiles beyond its borders were drawn down.
The standing 2026 ceiling totals 96.6kt, or 35% of 2025 global demand. Routine allocations account for 87kt, equal to 7,250 tonnes a month. ARECOMS controls a separate 9.6kt strategic quota for projects it considers nationally important.
The 35% comparison does not mean Congo supplies only 35% of the market. Indonesia, smaller producers, recycled material, inventories and Congolese cobalt already outside the country cover part of the remaining demand.
The export ban began on 22 February 2025 after cobalt hydroxide delivered to China fell to about $5.60 per pound, near or below production costs. Lower prices had also reduced the DRC’s export-tax revenue. A quota system replaced the ban in October and is scheduled to remain through 2027, subject to quarterly adjustment.
Much of Congo’s cobalt is recovered alongside copper. Strong copper economics allowed production to continue even when cobalt exports were blocked, giving domestic inventories time to rise. Producers began cutting output during 2026 as the quota fed back into mine plans.
The published ceiling still overstates predictable market supply. Delays pushed the 18.125kt allocation for late 2025 into 2026, and commercial exports did not resume until the end of the first quarter. Completed shipments now carry more weight than the announced quota.
Cobalt metal gained 130% in 2025, while cobalt hydroxide rose 328%. Hydroxide, the intermediate commonly shipped from the DRC to refiners, moved faster because it sat closest to the restricted supply.
Demand remained strong without producing the sudden price break. Electric vehicles and portable electronics used a combined 206kt in 2025, close to three-quarters of total demand. Export controls triggered the repricing.
By 24 June 2026, cobalt metal stood at $26.23 per pound and hydroxide at $25.40. Both were almost unchanged for the year. The initial policy shock had already lifted the market to a higher range, leaving shipment flows and downstream demand to determine whether it could hold.
Mine announcements describe potential supply. Export allocations and completed deliveries reveal how much cobalt the market can use.
China produced 78.6% of refined cobalt in 2025, reflecting a broader critical-minerals refining bottleneck that persists even when mining becomes more diverse. Restricted Congolese feedstock can pressure refinery operations, while China’s processing scale and inventories gain value when raw material is scarce.
Indonesia offers the clearest alternative, producing 42.5kt, or 14% of mined cobalt, in 2025. Its growth depends on large nickel-processing projects exposed to input costs and execution delays. Moving supply away from Congo can transfer the bottleneck rather than eliminate it.
Cobalt policy is also reshaping state relationships. A DRC-US agreement signed on 4 December 2025 linked mineral access with offtake rights, infrastructure and advance notice of changes to cobalt quotas. Export controls have moved beyond commodity management into bilateral statecraft.
Countries with inventories, refining capacity, recycled feedstock or viable alternative projects gain bargaining power. Industrial capacity without secure raw material faces higher costs and lower utilisation.
Once the delayed 2025 allocation clears, sustained shipments above the 7,250-tonne monthly base pace would loosen supply. Larger quarterly allocations, strategic-quota releases or domestic stockpile sales would reinforce the shift.
Every additional Indonesian tonne reduces reliance on Congolese exports. Lower processing costs and stronger project execution would show that alternative supply is scaling fast enough to challenge Congo’s control over the marginal unit.
Lithium iron phosphate batteries contain no cobalt, while lower-cobalt cathodes reduce consumption per battery. Neither chemistry suits every application, particularly where energy density, heat resistance and compact size carry greater weight.
Sustained high prices strengthen the economics of substitution and recycling. A successful supply squeeze accelerates the technologies designed to escape it.
The Central African Copperbelt contains some of the world’s largest copper-cobalt deposits. Cobalt is commonly recovered alongside copper, while decades of investment have concentrated large-scale mining in the region. The DRC supplied 73% of global mined cobalt in 2025.
No. The February 2025 measure restricted exports rather than closing every mine. Production continued and cobalt accumulated inside the country. Some producers later reduced output as the quota limited how much they could sell internationally.
No. It compares the 96.6kt formal export ceiling with 276kt of global demand in 2025. Other supply comes from Indonesia, smaller producers, recycling, inventories and Congolese material already outside the DRC.
Nickel-manganese-cobalt and nickel-cobalt-aluminium batteries use cobalt, as do many portable-electronics batteries. Lithium iron phosphate batteries contain none. Cobalt remains valuable where energy density, thermal stability and long operating life take priority.
Quarterly quota decisions and completed exports will test the policy through the rest of 2026. Shipments above the base pace would loosen supply, while delays or weaker flows would deepen the constraint.
In cobalt, the border ledger has become the supply curve.
